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Collaborative collection effort strategies based on the “Internet + recycling” 1 
business model 2 
 3 
ABSTRACT 4 
“Internet + recycling”, a new and emerging collecting mode, is booming in conjunction 5 
with widespread Internet use in China. For the recycling of waste electrical and electronic 6 
equipment (WEEE), this paper studies collaborative collection effort strategies in a collection 7 
system consisting of a third-party and an e-tailer based on the “Internet + recycling” business 8 
model. Considering the collaboration occurring during collecting and selling and mutual 9 
influences of partners on the recycling of old products, the paper applies collection effort cost 10 
sharing mechanisms to promote recycling. Four models, namely, the centralized model 11 
(C-Model), unit transfer price model (P-Model), unilateral cost sharing model (U-Model) and 12 
bilateral cost sharing model (B-Model), are established, and optimal decisions and members’ 13 
profits in various collaborative models are derived and compared. The results show that there 14 
exists an interval of profit sharing proportions in which each of the two cost sharing models is 15 
a Pareto improvement of the P-Model, and the total collection volume and profit of the 16 
collecting system increase in the B-Model relative to those in the U-Model under the same 17 
proportion of profit sharing. However, the B-Model is not necessarily a Pareto improvement 18 
of the U-Model. The results also show that profit improvements of both parties can be 19 
achieved without the third-party sharing the e-tailer’s collection effort cost in the B-Model 20 
when the collaborative marginal profit is large enough. The paper further explores the impact 21 
of the collaborative marginal profit and third-party’s market influence on the total collection 22 
volume and the efficiency of the collecting system. This study provides insight into the 23 
promotion of WEEE recycling and into the selection of collaborative strategies for Internet 24 
recycling enterprises. The work will prove beneficial to the development of the WEEE 25 
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“Internet + recycling” industry. 26 
Keywords: WEEE; Internet + recycling; Collaboration; Collection effort; Cost sharing; 27 
Bilateral participation 28 
1. Introduction 29 
Waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) has increased sharply with the rapid 30 
updating of products and with the shortening of product life cycles. It is estimated that the 31 
number of smartphone and panel computer users reached 2.16 billion and 1.2 billion in 2016, 32 
accounting for 20% and 15% of the world’s population, respectively (Greenpeace, 2016). 33 
Globally, approximately 30–50 million tons of WEEE are disposed of each year, with an 34 
estimated annual growth rate of 3–5% (Afroz, 2013). WEEE may contain valuable substances 35 
and even precious metals such as Au and Ag (Cucchiella, 2015). At the same time, WEEE can 36 
contain complex mixtures of potential environmental contaminants (Robinson, 2009). Under 37 
the dual effects of the resource crisis and environme tal pollution, increasing attention has 38 
been dedicated to the recycling and reuse of WEEE. 39 
As one of the world’s largest developing countries, China accounts for approximately 20% 40 
of the global volume of WEEE (Awasthi and Li, 2017) and has become the largest producer 41 
and consumer of electrical and electronic equipment (Zeng et al., 2017). In the past, most 42 
residents in China preferred to sell their WEEE to inf rmal peddlers or to store them at home. 43 
A recent questionnaire survey conducted in Hong Kong a d Shenzhen also shows that more 44 
than 75% of the respondents prefer to store their obsolete mobile phones at home rather than 45 
recycle them (Deng et al., 2017). An online survey of lithium-ion battery (LIB) recycling also 46 
shows that 59.6% of respondents in China store their sp nt LIBs at home, whereas only 29.5% 47 
recycle spent LIBs with whole electronics units (Gu et al., 2017). Even so, only a small 48 
quantity of collected e-waste reaches authorized recycl rs, and such waste flowing into the 49 
informal processing sector is sorted and dismantled using primitive methods in open air 50 
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(Awasthi and Li, 2017). Recovery price, convenience and personal information security are 51 
the main factors that influence customers’ willingness to engage in e-waste recycling (Deng et 52 
al., 2017). 53 
As is widely known, "Internet plus" has become China's national development strategy 54 
and has been highly encouraged through a series of policies and measures, such as “Guidance 55 
on actively promoting the ‘Internet +’ action” (SC, 2015) and “‘Internet +’ three-year action 56 
plan for green ecology” (NDRC, 2016). "Internet + recycling" refers to an O2O business 57 
model for online trading and offline recycling based on the use of Internet technology. The 58 
"Internet + recycling" industry is booming with strong support from government policies, 59 
widespread Internet use and the rapid evolution of smartphones in China. In recent years, 60 
many "Internet + recycling" enterprises have come into being; well-known examples include 61 
Huishouge, based in Wuhan (www.huishouge.cn); Aihuis ou, based in Shanghai 62 
(www.aihuishou.com); Kuaishou, based in Beijing (ww.kuaishou365.com); and Taolv365, 63 
based in Shenzhen (www.taolv365.com). "Internet + recycling” online platforms can be built 64 
by manufacturers, retailers, certified waste recyclers or third-party collectors, and platforms 65 
built by third-party collectors are the most common in practice. Recyclable goods include 66 
various types of items, such as intelligent digital products, notebook computers, household 67 
electronics, and clothes. This paper focuses on the "Int rnet + recycling" of WEEE provided 68 
by third parties such as Aihuishou. 69 
Compared to the traditional recycling mode, the “Inter et + recycling” mode is more 70 
convenient, and recycling prices are more transparent. In addition, the collector’s professional 71 
data deletion service reduces consumers’ worries concerning the leakage of private data 72 
stored in their digital products. More importantly, the new mode is more environmentally 73 
friendly and sustainable. It helps the Chinese governm nt regulate recycling channels and 74 
guarantees that recycled products are delivered to qualified processing enterprises. Due to the 75 
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use of advanced information technologies and automatic d ta processes, recovery efficiency 76 
can be greatly enhanced. Consequently, the "Internet + recycling" mode has been 77 
aggressively promoted by the Chinese government and in venture capital investments. 78 
Although the mode is still being popularized, its potential has already begun to show. For 79 
example, after the 2012 creation of Taolv365 (www. taolv365.com), an Internet trading 80 
platform for old products, the quantity of reclaimed mobile phones increased rapidly over the 81 
following three years (see Fig. 1). 82 
 83 
 84 
Generally, customers often need to buy new electric and electronic equipment (EEE) 85 
when they return their old EEE, and vice versa. Accordingly, a win-win result can be 86 
achieved when third-party collectors cooperate with e-tailers, as such cooperation can not 87 
only increase the recovery of old products and the sales of new ones but also provide 88 
customers with one-stop recycling and upgrading servic s. Therefore, such cooperation is 89 
often adopted in practice. For example, Aihuishou (www.aihuishou.com), the largest O2O 90 
electronic product collection company in China, strategically cooperates with Jd 91 
(www.jd.com), a famous e-commerce company. Fig. 2 illustrates the typical logical trajectory 92 
of this form of cooperation. First, customers place orders for returned items through the 93 
e-tailer’s or third party’s platform, and all orders are aggregated to the third party. Next, 94 
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Fig. 1. The quantity of mobile phones reclaimed through Taolv365 (data source: Xue, Y., 2017) 
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outlets of the third-party collector or through door-t -door collection. Then, the third-party 96 
collector confirms the recycling price and completes the payment based on a quality 97 
inspection of the returned products, and customers receive money in cash or in coupon form, 98 
where the coupon can be used to buy new products from the e-tailer. In the end, the collected 99 
WEEE is sold to various parties, including certified disassembly plants, the second-hand 100 
market or remanufacturers (see Fig. 2). 101 
 102 
The performance of the reverse channel strongly relies on collectors’ collection efforts, 103 
including their investments in advertising and promotional services, which motivate 104 
consumers to return their old products (Savaskan et al., 2004). Consumers can take express 105 
interest in returning their used products after receiving information through advertisements 106 
(Jena and Sarmah, 2015). Recycling price incentives, trading in the “old-for-new” model and 107 
coupons are all feasible means of promotion (Tong et al., 2018). Under the "Internet + 108 
recycling" mode, collection efforts can have several purposes, such as improving service 109 
quality and enhancing user experiences. For example, by 2018, Aihuishou had opened more 110 
than 300 outlets to provide face-to-face communication and transactions across 35 cities (Sun 111 
et al., 2018), while an outlet based in a downtown area itself serves as a good brand 112 
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Fig. 2. The logical flow of the cooperative “Internet + recycling” between a third-party and an e-tailer 




advertisement in addition to enhancing user experiences. 113 
Motivated by the above, this paper studies collabortive collection effort strategies 114 
employed in a collecting system involving an e-tailer and a third-party under the “Internet + 115 
recycling” business model. To the best of our knowledge, such a comprehensive examination 116 
of this issue has not been undertaken in the literature. To this end, the paper develops models 117 
of the collecting system, considering collaboration occurring during collecting and selling and 118 
collection effort cost sharing mechanisms facilitating the return of used products. The optimal 119 
collection efforts are examined and compared within t e framework of game theory, and 120 
members’ profits and system performance are analysed under different collaborative 121 
strategies. 122 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, a relevant literature review is provided. 123 
Section 3 describes the problem and modelling assumptions. In section 4, four collaborative 124 
collection models based on the “Internet+ recycling” mode are examined, and the optimal 125 
decisions for each party are derived. Section 5 compares recycling quantities, collection effort 126 
levels and profits in the four models and presents the analytical and numerical results. A 127 
sensitivity analysis is conducted in section 6. Section 7 finally concludes this work and 128 
discusses further research. 129 
2. Literature review 130 
The related literature can be classified into three research streams: collection channels, 131 
collection efforts and cooperative strategies of supply chains. 132 
Collection channel management is very central to reverse supply chains. Savaskan et al. 133 
(2004) proposed three models based on different revers  channels involving manufacturers, 134 
retailers and third parties in closed-loop supply chains (CLSCs) and found that retailer 135 
collection is the most effective means of product colle tion activity for the manufacturer. 136 
Savaskan and Wassenhove (2006) further extended the above models to multiple settings for 137 
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the case of competing retailers and studied strategic product pricing decisions and the 138 
manufacturer’s reverse channel choices. Atasu et al. (2013) investigated the impact of 139 
collection cost structures on optimal reverse channel decisions based on the work of Savaskan 140 
et al. (2004). Mohan et al. (2018) analysed the effcts of recycling and product quality levels 141 
on pricing decisions in a CLSC and showed that the unit price of the returned product paid to 142 
the retailer serves as an important determinant when selecting best channel structures between 143 
retailer- and manufacturer-led collection. Some works have focused on dual recycling or 144 
hybrid collection channels. Huang et al. (2013) investigated the channel configuration 145 
strategy of a CLSC with a dual recycling channel in which the retailer and third-party 146 
competitively collect used products and derived a parameter domain of competing intensity at 147 
which the dual recycling channel strategy outperforms the use of a single recycling channel. 148 
Hong et al. (2013) investigated three reverse hybrid collection channel structures in a 149 
manufacturer-oriented CLSC and showed that the retailer’s and manufacturer’s hybrid 150 
collection channel is the most effective. Liu et al. (2017) extended the work of Hong et al. 151 
(2013) and Huang et al. (2013) by comparing three types of hybrid competitive 152 
dual-recycling channel structures in a CLSC and found that the OEM and retailer dual 153 
collecting channel are the best tools regardless of the degree of competition intensity 154 
involved.  155 
While the above literature provides models for studying the channel decisions made in a 156 
reverse supply chain, it mainly discusses this issue within the framework of CLSCs and with 157 
reference to traditional recycling channels. In a recent work, Feng et al. (2017) explored the 158 
recycling channel decisions of a recyclables dealer using traditional recycling and online 159 
recycling channels, and they investigated the strategic planning regarding the optimal design 160 
and coordination decisions of the dealer. Gu et al. (2019) assessed the overall environmental 161 
performance of “Internet + recycling” through a case study and concluded that the disposal of 162 
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WEEE incurs the highest environmental savings. Tong et al. (2018) identified three types of 163 
business models for recyclables using Internet technologies in China and evaluated the 164 
performance of these models. Wang et al. (2018) investigated “Internet + recycling” practices 165 
in China and made some suggestions regarding the sustainable development of “Internet + 166 
recycling”. Sun et al. (2018) analysed the structures, digital empowerment activities and types 167 
of WEEE collection business ecosystems through a study of two typical Internet-based 168 
collection enterprises. It can be observed that the li erature focusing on “Internet + recycling” 169 
has grown dramatically over the past year. However, far too little attention has been paid to 170 
quantitative research regarding how to increase the quantity of WEEE acquired. Moreover, 171 
the recycling channel structure examined in this paper is different from that examined in the 172 
above literature, which includes a direct third-party online channel and an indirect e-tailer 173 
channel. The e-tailer’s platform acts as an important entry for recycling traffic, the e-tailer 174 
works together with the third party to provide consumers with one-stop services for recycling 175 
WEEE and for purchasing new ones, and the relationsh p between the third party and e-tailer 176 
is collaborative rather than competitive (see Fig. 2). 177 
Many studies have considered collection efforts employed in reverse channels. Savaskan 178 
et al. (2004) first modelled the return rate of used products as a function of collection efforts 179 
and set the structure of the collection effort cost. Later, similar structures of collection effort 180 
cost have been widely used in the analysis of recycling problems related to the recycling 181 
channel, pricing, remanufacturing decisions and coordination mechanisms. For example, Gao 182 
et al. (2016) explored the influence of different channel power structures on optimal CLSC 183 
pricing decisions, collection efforts, sales efforts and performance. However, none of these 184 
studies considered cost sharing employed for collection efforts.  185 
Cooperative strategies used in SCs have been comprehensively researched in the literature. 186 
Huang and Li (2001) investigated the efficiency of transactions for the system of 187 
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manufacturer – retailer co-op advertising in the context of game theory. Ahmadi-Javid and 188 
Hoseinpour (2012) analyzed the co-op advertising model under nonnegative constraints of the 189 
sales function based on the work of Huang and Li (2001). Hong et al. (2015) incorporated 190 
advertising effects into CLSC models. In these works involving cooperative advertising, 191 
unilateral cost sharing is frequently used. Zhang et al. (2013) extended the popular unilateral 192 
participation strategy to bilateral participation i cooperative advertising and showed that 193 
properly designed bilateral participation offers several advantages relative to unilateral 194 
participation. Li et al. (2017) examined cooperative advertising strategies used in an O2O 195 
supply chain and found that bilateral cooperative advertising can offer significant benefits to 196 
the seller and to the entire channel relative to unilateral cooperative advertising. However, the 197 
above literature examines issues regarding cooperativ  dvertising in terms of promoting the 198 
sale of new products. In a recent work, Jena et al. (2017) considered advertising as a means to 199 
entice consumers to return their used items in a CLSC, and they investigated the impacts of 200 
sharing or not sharing advertisement costs on totalprofits gained and on the quantity of used 201 
items acquired. Giovanni (2018) investigated whether retailers engage manufacturers to 202 
invest more heavily in green activity programmes by offering a joint incentive and showed 203 
that a joint maximization incentive always increases the manufacturers’ investments made in 204 
green efforts. Ghosh et al. (2018) studied competition and collaboration between an OEM and 205 
remanufacturer. Ma et al. (2016) investigated various cooperative strategies in a three-echelon 206 
CLSC; they mainly focused on cooperative interactions ccurring among members rather 207 
than cooperative collection efforts. Hence, collabor tive collection effort strategies with cost 208 
sharing in an “Internet + recycling” environment have not been addressed in the reverse 209 
supply chain literature. This paper considers the eff cts of collaboration between the third 210 
party and e-tailer on collecting and selling and investigates how collaborative collection 211 
strategies without cost sharing, with unilateral cost sharing or with bilateral cost sharing 212 
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affect the decisions of members and the performance of a collecting system. 213 
3. Problem description 214 
This paper considers a third-party, T, who collects used items from the market by using 215 
the “Internet + recycling” business model. To increas  the volume of the recovery and to 216 
provide a better re-buy service, T cooperates with e- ailer R to collect recyclables. The logical 217 
flow of the cooperation mode is shown in Fig. 2.  218 
Both T and R make efforts to motivate consumers to return their old products and 219 
provide consumers with related services for the purchase of new ones. A  and a  denote the 220 
collection effort investments of T and R, respectively. The direct collection volume through T 221 
is denoted as tq , and the indirect volume through R is denoted as r
q . Since R does not 222 
provide the complete recycling process alone but rathe  cooperates with T to complete it, each 223 
member’s collection efforts not only affect the collection volume of its own channel but also 224 
affect that of the other side. On one hand, the levl of T’s collection efforts determines its 225 
service quality and brand reputation and thus affects the recycling willingness of consumers 226 
directly or indirectly. On the other hand, because there are more opportunities for R to reach 227 
consumers, R’s advertising and promoting of recycling activities not only enhance her own 228 
recovery of old products and her sales of new ones but are also conducive to increasing the 229 
popularity of T, thus indirectly enhancing the click rate of T’s recycling platform. Hence, 230 
direct and indirect collection volumes travelling through the two recycling channels are 231 
respectively formulated as 232 
1t tq s A k a= + + ,                                                         (1) 233 
2r rq s a k A= + + .                                                         (2) 234 
The square root formulation of response functions denotes diminishing returns to 235 
collection effort expenses (Zhang et al., 2013), and A  and a  can be regarded as the two 236 
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parties’ levels of collection efforts. The additive function is also used in Jena et al. (2017). rs  237 
and ts  are positive constants representing the returned quantities when each member’s 238 
collection efforts are valued at zero; to facilitate calculation, the values of rs  and t
s  are set 239 
to zero, which does not affect the conclusions of this study. 1k  and 2
k  represent the 240 
influencing coefficients of each member’s collection efforts on the other side. Assume that 241 
each member’s collection efforts boost the other party’s collection volumes, so 1 2, (0,1)k k ∈ . 242 
Eqs. (1) - (2) indicate that the collection volume is a joint effort employed by T and R, 243 
and the values of A  and a  are related to the collaborative collection effort strategies 244 
adopted. Meanwhile, increasing the collection volume will increase the sales of new products 245 
and overall profits. To this end, four collaborative collection models are developed. The first 246 
model is a centralized model (C-Model) in which both T and R agree to make efforts to 247 
maximize the whole profits of the collecting system in an integrated manner. The second 248 
model is a unit transfer price model (P-Model) in which T pays a unit transfer price rb to R 249 
for items returned through the R channel. The third model is a unilateral cost sharing model 250 
(U-Model) in which T not only invests in her own channel but also bears part of R’s 251 
collection effort expenses. The fourth model is a bil teral cost sharing model (B-Model) in 252 
which each member shares partial costs of the other member, or rather, T shares a fraction, 1t253 
( 1 [0,1]t ∈ ), of R’s collection effort costs a , and R shares a fraction, 2t ( 2 [0,1]t ∈ ), of T’s costs 254 
A . Consistent with Zhang et al. (2013), 1t  and 2t  are referred to as T’s participation rate 255 
and R’s participation rate, respectively. Accordingly, the collaborative strategies based on the 256 
three decentralized decision models are referred to as the P-strategy, U-strategy and 257 
B-strategy, respectively. 258 
Let b  be the marginal profit generated from recycling per unit of used product. The 259 
appropriate allocation of recycling profit, i.e., b, between T and R is investigated in this paper. 260 
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R not only shares income from the recovery of old products but also earns “old-for-new” 261 
profits. Let u  be the collaborative marginal profit derived from the additional sale of new 262 
products caused by the recovery of per unit of old ones, and assume that 0b u≥ ≥ . Generally, 263 
the higher the value of a product, the higher the collaborative marginal profit u . In addition, 264 
the stronger the level of coordination between T and R, the greater the probability of 265 
converting from recovery to purchasing and thus the greater the value of u .  266 
The symbols used for the development of collaborative collection models are presented 267 
in Table 1. 268 
Table 1. Descriptions of the symbols. 269 
Symbol Description 
A  Collection effort investments of the third-party, decision variable 
a  Collection effort investments of the e-tailer, decision variable 
1k  Influence coefficient of the e-tailer 's collection efforts to the third-party 
2k  Influence coefficient of the third-party’s collection efforts to the e-tailer 
tq  Direct collection volume through the third-party’s channel 
rq  Indirect collection volume through the e-tailer’s channel 
b  Marginal profit by recycling one unit of used products 
u  
Collaborative marginal profit for the sale of new products through the recovery of per 
unit of old ones 
rb  Unit transfer price paid to the e-tailer by the third-party, decision variable 
β  Proportion of profit sharing for the e-tailer 
1t  
Proportion of the e-tailer’s collection effort investments shared by the third-party, 
decision variable 
2t  




Profit of channel member i in model j. Subscript { , , }i t r s∈  refers to the third-party, 
the e-tailer and the whole collecting system separately. Superscript { , , , }j C P U B∈  
refers to the C-Model, P-Model, U-Model and B-Model s parately. 







πη π= . 
 270 
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4. Collaborative collection effort models 271 
   In this section, four collection effort models, namely, the centralized model (C-Model), 272 
unit transfer price model (P-Model), unilateral cost sharing model (U-Model) and bilateral 273 
cost sharing model (B-Model), are established, the optimal decisions are derived, and the 274 
influences of the key parameters on the optimal decisions are discussed. In the decentralized 275 
models, T is regarded as the Stackelberg game leader an  R as the follower. 276 
4.1 C-Model 277 
In this case, T and R belong to the same business conglomerate and act as a single entity, 278 
and thus only one decision maker determines A  and a  to maximize the total profits of the 279 
collection system. The total profit of the system is denoted as 280 
2 1( ) (1 ) (1 )
C
s b u k A k a A aπ  = + + + + − −                          (3) 281 












, an optimal solution 282 















 + + =  
  

+ +  =  
 
                               (4) 284 
The optimal collection volumes are obtained based on collection effort levels, which are 285 
given by 286 
2




b u k k k
q
+ + + += ，                                                 (5) 287 
2




b u k k k
q
+ + + +=                                                    (6) 288 
The total profit of the collecting system is 289 
2 2 2




b u k kπ + + + +=                                                (7) 290 
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These acquired closed-form solutions in the C-Model offer benchmarking for designing 291 
cooperative collection effort models. 292 
4.2 P-Model 293 
In this model, both T and R make efforts to motivate consumers to return WEEE, but they 294 
must address their collection effort expenses indivdually. T provides a unit transfer price rb295 
to R to induce her to collect used products. In addition, R earns additional profits from 296 
increased sales of new products due to the recovery of old products. The profit expressions of 297 
T and R can be written as 298 
( )1 2( ) ( )Pt rb A k a b b a k A Aπ = + + − + −                           (8) 299 
( ) ( )2 1( )Pr rb u a k A u A k a aπ = + + + + −                                    (9) 300 
As the Stackelberg leader, T first proposes collection effort Aand unit transfer price rb , 301 
and then R determines the collection effort a .302 
 Via standard backward induction, the optimal soluti n of the collection efforts from the 303 





P rb u ka
+ + =  
 
                                     (10) 305 










. In the P-Model, the optimal collection efforts of T 306 
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− + − + < −= 
 ≥




















+ − + − < −= 
+ ≥

 ,                                    (12) 309 
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 + − + − + <
 −= 
+ ≥
                                (13) 310 
Proof. See Appendix A. 311 
Proposition 1 implies that there is always an optimal combination of ( *PA , *Prb ) for 312 
maximizing the profit of T in the P-Model. The condition 
Pu u< guarantees that the optimal 313 
unit transfer price is greater than zero. When 
Pu u≥ , even when R cannot obtain a transfer 314 
payment for her collection efforts, she still gains quite good returns due to a high added 315 
collaborative profit. 316 
The proportion of profit sharing for R’s collecting can be calculated as 317 
*
* *1 2 2
2
2




P Prb b u k k b k
b k b
β β− + − += = ∈
−
 .                               (14) 318 
The optimal collection volumes of direct and indirect channels can be computed from Eqs. 319 
(1) - (2), and the optimal profits of T and R in the P-Model are obtained from Eqs. (8) - (9).  320 
   It is easy to observe that in the P-Model, the optimal unit transfer price 
*P
rb  is 321 
monotonically decreasing in u  and 2k , whereas the optimal collection efforts and optimal 322 
profits of both T and R increase with increasing u . For the collection of products with high 323 
collaborative marginal profits, T can pay R a low transfer payment because R can obtain 324 
compensation from increasing sales of new products. In addition, in early stages when T 325 
enters the recovery market, which involve a lower value of 2k , T should pay R a higher 326 
transfer price to attract R to participate in collecting. Similarly, both T and R invest more in 327 
the collection of highly profitable items such as smartphones. All of these principles are 328 
consistent with observable reality. 329 
4.3 U-Model 330 
Collaborative collecting involves the joint efforts of T and R to increase collection 331 
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volumes, the sales of new products and overall profits. To achieve better performance, a 332 
unilateral cost sharing model (U-Model) is proposed, in which dominant party T not only 333 
invests in his own channel collection efforts but also bears a fraction 1t ( 1 [0,1]t ∈ ) of R’s 334 
collection effort expenses. Meanwhile, T shares a proportion 1 β−  of the R collection 335 
channel’s profits, and the value of β ( [0,1]β ∈ ) is determined by both T and R.  336 
The profit functions of T and R are formulated as  337 
( )1 2 1( ) (1 )Ut b A k a b a k A A t aπ β= + + − + − −                          (15) 338 
( ) ( )2 1 2 1(1 )Ur b a k A u A k a a k A t aπ β= + + + + + − −                          (16) 339 
T first discloses his collection effort level and participation rate, and then R determines 340 
her collection effort level.  341 






r b u k t
a a







[ (1 )] 0
4
r b u k a
a
π β −∂ = − + + <
∂
 343 
This implies that 
U
rπ  is a concave function, and from the first-order condition, the 344 







U b u ka
t
β + +=  − 
                                                       (17) 346 
By substituting Ua  into Eq. (15) and solving T's problem, the optimal result is presented 347 
by Proposition 2. 348 
Proposition 2. Let 1(2 )(1 )min{ ,1}
3
U b u k
b
β − += ; in the U-Model, the optimal participation 349 




(2 2 3 ) (1 )
,  
(2 2 ) (1 )




k b u k




+ − − + < + − + += 
 ≥
,                                     (18) 351 
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and the optimal collection efforts of T and R are given by 352 
* 2[1 (1 )] , [0,1]
2
U b kA


















+ − + + <=  + + ≥

                                       (20) 354 
Proof. See Appendix B. 355 
Proposition 2 indicates that when the proportion of pr fit sharing for R is not too great (i.e.,356 
Uβ β< ), T has an incentive to share R’s collection effort expenses to promote collecting for 357 
both direct and indirect channels. Otherwise, when the proportion is dominant enough 358 
( Uβ β≥ ), T will not participate in R’s expenses (1 0t = ), and so the U-Model is transformed 359 
into the P-Model; then, the value of β  can be determined from Eq. (14). To distinguish it 360 
from the P-Model, the U-Model described below refers to a situation in which 1t  is greater 361 
than 0. 362 
Uβ denotes a critical value. The smaller the collaborative profit u  is, the larger 
Uβ is 363 
and the more likely T is willing to share R’s collection effort expenses. In contrast, R's 364 
influence coefficient 1k  has a positive effect on the critical value 
Uβ .  365 
The formulation of an optimal collection volume can be computed from Eqs. (1) - (2), and 366 
the optimal profits of T and R can be determined from Eqs. (15) - (16). 367 
From Proposition 2, Corollaries 1- 3 can be easily obtained. 368 
Corollary 1 In the U-Model, the optimal participation rate 1t  is monotonically 369 
decreasing in u  and is independent of 2k . 370 
Corollary 1 implies that T should share more collection effort expenses of R for the sake 371 
of maximizing his profit when the collaborative marginal profit is small. For example, in the 372 
early stages of their cooperation, the conversion rate derived from the recovery of old 373 
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products to the sale of new ones may be low due to poor coordination, which results in a 374 
small value of u . Under such conditions, T should undertake more collection effort 375 
investments of R. However, an increase in 2k , which can be regarded as the strengthening 376 
influence of T on the recycling market, does not affect T’s participation rate. 377 
Corollary 2 In the U-Model, the optimal collection effort of R increases in u  and is 378 
independent of 2k , whereas the optimal collection effort of T is monotonically increasing in 379 
2k  and is independent of u . 380 
   Corollary 2 indicates that the collaborative marginal profit u  has a positive impact on 381 
R's collection effort but has no effect on T’s collection effort. In contrast, an increase in 2k382 
does not cause R to increase her collection effort level, but it will increase T’s collection 383 
effort level. 384 
Corollary 3 In the U-Model, the profits of both T and R are monotonically increasing 385 
functions of u  and 2k . 386 
Although only R’s collection effort increases with an increase of u , the profits of both T 387 
and R still grow as the direct and indirect collection volumes increase with respect to u ,388 
which implies that a higher collaborative marginal profit is beneficial not only to R but also to 389 
T. The same is true for the influence coefficient 2k . 390 
4.4 B-Model 391 
Studies have shown that bilateral participation canimprove the channel efficiency of 392 
cooperative advertising strategies (Zhang et al., 2013). During the cooperative collection 393 
between T and R, as shown in Fig. 2, is R willing to share a portion of T’s collection costs to 394 
increase collection volumes and to thus promote the sal  of new products? This is what the 395 
paper investigates regarding the B-Model. In this ca e, both members not only invest in their 396 
own channel collecting efforts but also bear a fraction 1 2/t t  ( 1 2, (0,1)t t ∈ ) of the other side’s 397 
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collection expenses. They share the collecting profit, and β ( (0,1)β ∈ ) is the proportion of 398 
profit sharing for R. 399 
The profit functions of T and R are formulated as follows: 400 
( )1 2 2 1( ) (1 ) (1 )Bt b A k a b a k A t A t aπ β= + + − + − − −                         (21) 401 
( )2 2 1 1 2[(1 ) (1 ) ] (1 )Br b a k A u k A k a t a t Aπ β= + + + + + − − −                          (22) 402 
  There are four decision variables in the B-Model, including the collection effort 403 
investments of T and R, A  and a , and the bilateral participation rates 1t and 2t . 404 
According to Zhang et al. (2013), there are some rul s regarding the allocation of 405 
decision-making power that game players should follow to avoid trivial or unreasonable game 406 
results. In applying these rules to the B-Model, suppose that the leader of the game makes a 407 
decision about participation rates, while the follower makes decisions about collection efforts. 408 
Again, by using backward induction, the optimal result is presented by Proposition 3. 409 





B b u k
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β − += . For any given β  in the B-Model, the 410 
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k b u k
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+ + − <=  + + ≥

                                         (26) 417 
Proof. See Appendix C. 418 
Since B Uβ β≥  and *2 0
Bt >  always hold, according to Proposition 3, the B-strategy 419 
would become another U-strategy when Uβ β≥ . In other words, T may not need to share part 420 
of the collection effort cost of R (*1 0
Bt = ), whereas R must share part of the cost of T(*2 0
Bt > ). 421 
This means that it is always beneficial to T when R bears a fraction of T’s investment in 422 
collection efforts, while whether T has an incentive to share R’s collection effort expense is 423 
related to the value of β , i.e., T has an incentive only when Uβ β< .  424 
Hence, under the B-strategy, the optimal collection v lumes can be computed from Eqs. 425 
(1) - (2), and the optimal profits of T and R can be obtained from Eqs. (21) - (22). 426 
  From Proposition 3, Corollary 4 is easily obtained. 427 
Corollary 4 In the B-Model, R’s optimal participation rate 2t , T’s collection effort A  428 
and the profits of both T and R are monotonically increasing with respect to 2k  and u . 429 
Corollary 4 shows that higher collaborative profit and stronger influence of T can increase 430 
R’s participation rate and T’s collection effort investments. Consequently, the profits of both 431 
T and R can be improved. 432 
5. Comparative analysis 433 
According to the above results, some conclusions ca be drawn through the comparison 434 
of different collaborative collection effort models. The following numerical analysis 435 
illustrates the results; the initial parameter setting is 10b = , 1 0.5k = , 2 0.1k = , 3u = . 436 
5.1 Comparison of the U-Model and P-Model 437 
Proposition 4. When *Pβ β=  in the U-Model, relative to the P-Model, ordinal 438 
relationships of optimal collection efforts are relat d as * *P UA A=  and * *P Ua a< . 439 
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Consequently, collection volumes are related as follows: * *P Ur rq q<  and 
* *P U
t tq q< . The 440 
member's profits are related as follows: * *U Pt tπ π> , 
* *U P
r rπ π>  and 
* *U P
s sπ π> . 441 
   Proof. See Appendix D. 442 
   Proposition 4 implies that under the same profit share as the optimal one in the P-Model, 443 
R’s collection effort investments will be enhanced in the U-Model, whereas T’s collection 444 
effort investments remain the same. As T shares part of the collection effort investment of R, 445 
the total collection effort investment increases; thus, the collection volumes of the direct and 446 
indirect channels increase, and the profits of both T and R in the U-Model are greater than 447 
those in the P-Model. Therefore, the U-strategy is a Pareto improvement of the P-strategy 448 
when the profit share remains the same as that of P-strategy. 449 
Corollary 5 Let 
( )21 2 2 2 2
2
2
1 2 2 2 (1 )
(1 4 )
UL
k k k b k u k
k b
β
+ + + − +
=
+
. In the U-Model, the optimal 450 
profits of both T and the collecting system are monot ically decreasing in β , and the 451 
following hold: 452 
(i) if UL Uβ β≥ , the optimal profit of R is an increasing function f β  when Uβ β≤ ; 453 
(ii) if UL Uβ β< , the optimal profit of R is an increasing function f β  when ULβ β≤  and a 454 
decreasing function of β  when UL Uβ β β< ≤ .  455 
 Proof. See Appendix E. 456 
Corollary 5 shows that increasing the proportion of profit sharing for R is always 457 
disadvantageous to both T and the collecting system under U-strategy and is not always 458 
advantageous to R. 459 
Corollary 6 There is always an interval ( , )U Ur tβ β  in the U-Model in which 
U
rβ  and 460 
U
tβ  satisfy 
*0 U Prβ β≤ ≤  and 
*P U U
tβ β β< ≤ , respectively. When the value of β  falls 461 
within the range of ( , )U Ur tβ β , the optimal profits of both T and R will increase in the 462 
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U-Model relative to those in the P-Model. 463 
Proof. See Appendix F. 464 
Corollary 6 extends the range of β  in which the U-strategy is a Pareto improvement of 465 
the P-strategy. This also shows that when the value of β  is within a certain range under the 466 
U-strategy, a win-win result can be achieved relative o that achieved with the P-strategy. In 467 
Fig. 3a, Urβ  and 
U















= , respectively. When UL Uβ β≥ , the optimal profit of R is a monotonically 469 
increasing function of β  under the U-strategy, thresholds 
U
rβ and Utβ  satisfy 
*0 U Prβ β≤ < , 470 
and *P U Utβ β β< ≤ , respectively, and thus the optimal profits of both T and R increase in the 471 
U-Model relative with those of the P-Model when ( , )U Ur tβ β β∈ (see Fig. 3a). When 472 
UL Uβ β< , the optimal profit of R first increases and then decreases with increasing β . In 473 








> , * 0U Prβ β= =  holds, and thus a win-win result 474 
can also be achieved when using the U-strategy rather than the P-strategy when (0, )Utβ β∈475 





















































Fig. 3. Comparison between the U-Model and P-Model: (a) if  and (b) if  
(a)                                                      (b) 
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 486 
5.2 Comparison of the B-Model and P-Model 487 
Proposition 5. When *Pβ β= , relative to the P-Model, the ordinal relationships of the 488 
optimal collection efforts are * *P BA A<  and * *P Ba a< . Consequently, the collection volumes 489 
are as follows: * *P Br rq q<  and 
* *P B
t tq q< . The members’ profits are related as follows: 490 
* *B P
t tπ π> , 
* *B P
r rπ π≥  when 0M ≥ , 
* *B P
r rπ π<  when 0M < , and 
* *B P
s sπ π> where 491 
( )2* 2 2 * 21 2 2 1 2 2(2 4 ) [1 (1 )] (2 ) [ 1 (1 ) ] 3(1 )( )P PM b u b k k k b u u k k k bβ β= − + − + + − + − + − − . 492 
Proof. See Appendix G.  493 
Proposition 5 shows that with the same proportion of pr fit sharing as the optimal one in 494 
the P-Model, when both T and R share part of the coll ction investments of the other side, the 495 
collection efforts of both sides and the collection volumes of both channels will increase, and 496 
for T and the collecting system, the B-Model is more p ofitable than the P-Model. However, 497 
for R, only when 0M ≥  is the optimal profit of R for the B-Model higher than that of the 498 
P-Model. Through data simulations, it is also found that 0M ≥  almost always holds when 499 
1 2k k≥ , although it cannot be analytically proven due to the complexity of M . 500 
Corollary 7 In the B-Model, the profit of R is an increasing function of β , and in 501 
contrast, the profits of both T and the collecting system are decreasing functions of β . 502 
Proof. See Appendix H. 503 
Corollary 7 indicates that increasing the proportion of profit sharing for R can increase 504 
R’s profit, but it is at the expense of the profits of T and the collection system. There must be 505 
appropriate values of β  for a trade-off between T and R. 506 
Corollary 8  There is always an interval ( , )B Br tβ β  in the B-Model in which 507 
*0 B Prβ β≤ ≤  and 
* 1P Btβ β< ≤  when 0M ≥  and in which 
* , 1P B Br tβ β β< ≤  when 0M < . 508 
When the value of β  falls within the range of ( , )B Br tβ β , the optimal profits of both T and R 509 
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will increase relative to those of the P-Model. 510 
Proof. As it is similar to the proof of Corollary 6, the proof is omitted here. 511 
Corollary 8 gives the range of the profit share β  in which the B-strategy is a Pareto 512 
improvement of P-strategy. In Fig. 4, Brβ , 
B

























> , 514 
and so *0 B Prβ β≤ < and 
* 1P Btβ β< ≤  (see Fig. 4a). Keeping the values of other parameters 515 







< , and thus 516 

















(a)                                                    (b) 
Fig. 5. The optimal proportion of cost sharing under the 
B-Model as varies 




























Fig. 6. Comparison of collection volumes between the 
B-Model and P-Model 
























Fig. 4. Comparison of the optimal profits between the B-Model and P-Model. (a) 0M ≥  and (b) 0M <  





















































Note that B Utβ β>  may be true (see Fig. 4b). When 
B U
tβ β>  and ( , )
U B
tβ β β∈ , 
*
1 0t ≡  537 
and *2 0t >  hold (see Fig. 5). Under such conditions, as the colle tion efforts of R increase 538 
with increasing β , both the direct and indirect collection volumes increase instead of 539 
decreasing (see Fig. 6). This result suggests that w en B Utβ β> , T can afford R a higher 540 
proportion of profit sharing without sharing part of R's collection effort costs, and hence an 541 
improvement in profit for both parties and a significant increase in the total collection volume 542 
can be achieved. 543 
 544 








Through data simulations, it is found that the thres old value of Btβ  first increases and 553 
then decreases with increasing u , whereas the threshold value of Uβ  decreases more 554 
rapidly, and thus the higher the value of u , the more likely R is to share part of T’s 555 
collection effort cost unilaterally (see Fig. 7a). Similarly, the value of Btβ  first increases and 556 
then decreases with increasing in 2k , whereas the value of 
Uβ  is independent on 2k ; thus, 557 
(a)                                                        (b) 




























tβ β>  holds only when 2k  is not large enough (see Fig. 7b). This result explains why 558 
some e-tailers direct large amounts of capital to their recycling partners to facilitate the 559 
recovery of WEEE of high value, such as smartphones (which means that the value of u560 
may be higher), especially in early stages, when T is just entering the recycling market (which 561 
means that the value of 2k  may be lower). 562 
5.3 Comparison of the B-Model and U-Model 563 
Proposition 6. For any value of ( )Uβ β β< , the ordinal relationships of optimal 564 
collection efforts between the U-Model and B-Model are related as follows: * *U BA A<  and 565 
* *U Ba a= . Consequently, the collection volumes are related as follows: * *U Br rq q<  and566 
* *U B
t tq q< . The ordinal relationships of the profits are as follows: 
* *B U
t tπ π> , 
* *B U
r rπ π<  and 567 
* *B U
s sπ π> . 568 
Proof. See Appendix I. 569 
 570 








Proposition 6 indicates that under the same proportion of profit sharing, the B-Model is 579 
more profitable for T and the collection system but less profitable for R relative to the 580 
U-Model. In Fig. 8, since the profit of T decreases whereas the profit of R increases with 581 
















Fig. 8. Comparison of the member’s optimal profits 
between the B-Model and U-Model 
Fig. 9. Comparison of the profits of the collecting 
system under centralized and decentralized decisions 


















respect toβ , for a proportion of profit sharing 

















implies (3)iβ β> . However, 583 
(3) (2)β β>  holds; thus, there is not necessarily a corresponding value 














r rβ β β β
π π
= =
>  simultaneously. Clearly, whether the 585 
B-Model is a Pareto improvement of the U-Model depends on the crucial parameters of the 586 
collection system and the profit sharing proportion β . 587 
According to Proposition 6, it is easy to see that 
U B
r rβ β≤  and U Bt tβ β≤ . 588 
Through the above comparisons, it is obvious that te ordinal relationship of total profits 589 
for all of the collaborative collection effort models is * * * *C B U Ps s s sπ π π π> > >  when β  falls 590 
within the range of [0, ]Uβ  (see Fig. 9).  591 
6. Sensitivity analysis  592 
The impacts of the influence coefficient 2k  and collaborative marginal profit u  on the 593 
total collection volume and efficiency of the collecting system are further discussed. Since 594 










sq β β=  respectively represent the highest and lowest colle tion 596 
volumes of the profit improvement interval ( , )U Ur tβ β  for the U-Model, and a similar 597 
conclusion is drawn for the B-Model. Thus, for the following analysis, in the cost sharing 598 
models, the proportions of profit sharing are set to the lower and upper bounds of the profit 599 
improvement interval, respectively.  600 
In Fig. 10, it is observed that total collection volumes in the three decentralized models 601 
increase with increasing u  and 2k , and 
* *B P
s sq q>  and 
* *U P
s sq q>  always hold for any 602 
values of u  and 2k . Fig. 10(a) shows that when u  is low and when β  is at the lower 603 
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bound, the total collection volumes differ little btween the B-Model and U-Model, whereas 604 
the total collection volume is significantly greater in the B-Model than that in the U-Model 605 
when the value of u  is large and when the proportion of profit sharing β  is at the upper 606 
bound. In contrast, the total collection volumes differ little between the B-Model and 607 
U-Model when the value of β  is at the lower bound and when the value of 2k  is low or 608 
when the value of 2k  is high while the value of β  is at the upper bound (see Fig. 10b). Fig. 609 
10 also shows that the difference between the U-Model and B-Model is more heavily affected 610 
by u  than 2k  when the value of β  is at the upper bound. 611 
 612 


























(a)                                                            (b) 
Fig. 10. Comparison of the total collection volumes (a) as varies  and (b) as varies 
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Fig. 11(a) shows that the collecting system efficien y of each cost sharing model is far 630 
higher than that of the P-Model, and the efficiency of the collecting system mainly follows a 631 
downward trend with increasing u  in each of the three decentralized models. Fig. 11(a) also 632 
indicates that the efficiency of the B-Model is not higher than that of the U-Model when the 633 
value of u is very small. However, since the efficiency of the U-Model decreases more 634 
rapidly, the B-Model is more efficient than the U-Model when the value of u is large enough 635 
regardless of the profit sharing proportion involved. In Fig. 11(b), 
(1)
2k  represents the 636 
threshold value that gives * 0Pβ = . Fig. 11(b) illustrates that the system’s efficiency decreases 637 
with increasing 2k  in the P-Model when 
(1)
2 2k k< , but when 
(1)
2 2k k≥ , it increases as the 638 
collection volume increases more quickly with increasing in 2k . In addition, Fig. 11 shows 639 
that the system’s efficiency in both the U-Model and B-Model is less affected by 2k . 640 
The conclusions of the sensitivity analysis offer further guidance regarding how to make 641 
optimal decisions according to actual situations based on the market influences of T, levels of 642 
coordination, and types and values of collected proucts involved. 643 
7．Conclusion 644 
In this paper, collaborative collection effort strategies involving a third-party collector 645 
and an e-tailer based on the “Internet + recycling” business model are explored. The paper 646 
develops four cases of collaborative collection models, derives the optimal decisions, 647 
conducts a comparative analysis of these models and analyses the impact of crucial 648 
parameters on the collection volume and efficiency of the collecting system. 649 
The main findings of this paper are as follows. (i) There exists an interval of profit 650 
sharing proportion in which each of the two cost sharing strategies is a Pareto improvement 651 
of the unit transfer price strategy. (ii) An increas  in the collaborative marginal profit can 652 
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increase the e-tailer’s participation rate and her collection effort level under cost sharing 653 
strategies and thus improve the e-tailer’s and third party’s profits. (iii) An increase in the 654 
market influence of the third-party has no effect on the collection effort level of the e-tailer, 655 
but it can increase the participation rate of the e-tail r and thus improve the profits of both 656 
parties. (iv) Under the B-strategy, when the collabor tive marginal profit is large enough, the 657 
third party can give the e-tailer a higher proportion of profit sharing but does not need to 658 
share part of the e-tailer’s collection effort cost, and thus a Pareto improvement of the 659 
P-strategy can also be achieved. (v) Although the total collection volume and profit of the 660 
collecting system increase under the B-strategy relativ  to those of the U-strategy under the 661 
same proportion of profit sharing, the B-strategy is not necessarily a Pareto improvement of 662 
the U-strategy. 663 
The above conclusions provide some useful suggestions f r "Internet + recycling" 664 
enterprises. First, it is more profitable for a third-party collector and an e-tailer to share a 665 
portion of the other's collection investments under the cooperative "Internet + recycling" 666 
mode. For instance, Jd.com, a famous e-tailer in China, cooperates with Aihuishou.com, a 667 
professional O2O electronic product collection company, in WEEE recycling. Jd.com has 668 
made several rounds of investment to Aihuishou.com t  facilitate the recovery of WEEE of 669 
high value, such as smartphones, which can be explained by the B-strategy. Second, the third 670 
party should consider the types and values of WEEE involved when making the optimal 671 
choice. For example, for high-value WEEE collection, higher collection volumes and levels 672 
of system efficiency can be achieved under the B-strategy with a high profit sharing 673 
proportion than that involved when using the U-strategy, but for low-value WEEE collection, 674 
the third party may adopt the U-strategy with a lowprofit sharing proportion rather than the 675 
B-strategy with a high profit sharing proportion to obtain greater collection volume. Third, 676 
the third-party and e-tailer must strengthen coordination and resource integration to increase 677 
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the probability of converting from recovery to purchasing with help of “Internet+”, which can 678 
improve not only the profit of the e-tailer but also the profit of the collector.  679 
In future research, some assumptions may be relaxed to develop more comprehensive 680 
collaborative collection systems, such as a case in which a system includes e-tailers and 681 
third-party collectors in addition to consumers, where both the recycling price paid to 682 
customers and the discount for buying new products affecting the system should be 683 
considered. It would be interesting to study how partners make optimal decisions and how the 684 
consumer surplus changes during one-stop recycling and upgrading services under different 685 
collaborative strategies based on the “Internet + recycling” business model. 686 
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The first- and second-order derivatives of Eq. (A1) are given by 786 
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to maximize the profit of the third party in the P-Model.  797 
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Appendix B. The proof of Proposition 2 799 
Substituting Ua  into Eq. (15), the first-order derivatives of Utπ  are given by 800 
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Highlights 
 Collaborative collection effort strategies with/without cost sharing are studied. 
 Optimal decisions and member’s profits in various strategies are compared. 
 Cost sharing strategies can achieve win-win results in a certain profit sharing range. 
 Collaborative  marginal profit has a greater impact on cost sharing strategies. 
 
